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INTRODUCTION 
The State respectfully submits the following arguments in response to 
Defendant's Brief of Appellee. Any issues not addressed in this Reply are 
adequately addressed in the State's opening brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT'S WAIVER OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS WAS 
KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT BECAUSE THE WARNINGS 
GIVEN BY DETECTIVE MOOSMAN WERE ADEQUATE 
Defendant asserts that, in its claim challenging the trial court's suppression 
ruling, "much of the State's argument is based on a presumption that Miranda 
was properly presented." Aple. Br. at 4. Defendant's contention is false. The 
trial court below properly found that Defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights 
was voluntary (R. 82). Thus, the only question on appeal is whether Defendant's 
waiver of his Miranda rights was also knowing and intelligent. The only way the 
State can establish that Defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent is to 
show that he was adequately informed of his Miranda rights before his waiver. 
Consequently, most, if not all, of the State's argument in its opening brief focuses 
on evidence and law challenging the trial court's conclusion that Defendant was 
not adequately informed of those rights. 
Moreover, contrary to Defendant's suggestion, the State has not argued 
that "simply asking an accused if he understands [his] rights . . . substitute[s] for 
an adequate recitation of those rights." Aple. Br. at 4. Nor has the State argued 
that Defendant's "prior familiarity with [his] rights" because of his experience 
with the criminal justice system "alleviate[s] the need to be warned prior to 
interrogation." Id. at 6. Nor, finally, has the State challenged the trial court's 
finding that Defendant did not pay "'absolute attention'" or "'focus exclusively'" 
on the Admonition of Rights Form as he completed it. Aple. Br. at 6. 
Rather, the State argues that, given the totality of the circumstances in this 
case, the trial court erred in concluding that Defendant's failure to pay absolute 
attention or focus exclusively on the Admonition of Rights Form meant— 
essentially as a matter of law —that Defendant did not adequately understand 
the "relatively simple" rights. State v. Bybee, 2000 UT 43, t 27,1 P.3d 1087. 
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The part of the Admonition of Rights Form setting forth Defendant's 
Miranda rights consists of five paragraphs at the top of the Form (R. 128). The 
first four paragraphs contain one sentence each (Id.). The fifth paragraph 
contains two sentences (Id.). 
The first of the five paragraphs was read to Defendant aloud by Detective 
Moosman and, when asked, Defendant stated that he understood that right 
(R.126:13:38:07-13:38:09). Thus, at the time Detective Moosman agreed to let 
Defendant review his rights on his own, Defendant had only four more brief 
paragraphs to read in order to be informed of his rights (R. 128). As the 
videotape shows, Defendant spent approximately one minute reviewing those 
five sentences (R. 126:13:38:09-13:40:15). And, as the videotape shows, Defendant 
spent that minute drawing his pen back and forth across the page, stopping 
periodically to place his initials on the page (Id.). 
The trial court concluded that Defendant's completion of the Admonition 
of Rights Form was inadequate to inform him of his rights — essentially that 
Defendant's reading of the Form was merely in pretence. The record does not 
support that conclusion. 
First, if Defendant's goal was to complete the Admonition of Rights Form, 
not to comprehend it, he would have had no reason to spend so much time 
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looking at the Form, dragging his pen back and forth across the lines. He could 
have quickly completed the Form by simply placing his initials by each 
paragraph and signing the Form where instructed. That process would have 
taken seconds at most. Defendant's completion of the Form, however, did not 
take seconds; it took at least one minute. And Defendant's greater attention to 
the Form does not support the trial court's conclusion that Defendant was not 
paying attention to the rights listed on the Form. 
Second, in determining whether Defendant's review of the Form was 
adequate to inform him of his Miranda rights, the trial court did not consider 
either the totality of the circumstances and the simplicity of the rights involved. 
The trial court should have considered Defendant's previous experience with 
law enforcement (R. 121:3-6; R. 127:28), which suggests that Defendant was 
familiar with the rights he was reviewing. Cf. State v. Dutchie, 969 P.2d 422, 427 
(Utah 1998) (holding that defendant's "familiarity with the criminal justice 
system" is part of totality of circumstances court should consider in determining 
whether waiver of Miranda rights is valid). And the trial court should have 
considered the fact that the Miranda rights, though "important," are "relatively 
simple." State v. Bybee, 2000 UT 43, f 27,1 P.3d 1087. If, as Bybee suggests, a 
person can understand his Miranda rights even though he is not "thinking as 
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clearly as he could have been," id., the trial court erred in ruling that a veteran of 
the criminal justice system could not understand those rights merely because he 
was not paying "absolute attention" to or "focus[ing] exclusively" on those rights 
while reviewing them. 
In sum, the trial court ruled that Defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights 
was not knowing and intelligent because, according to the court, Defendant's 
review of the Admonition of Rights Form was inadequate to inform him of his 
rights. Neither the record nor the law supports that conclusion. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S APPLICATION OF RULE 24 TO THE 
STATE'S PRE-JUDGMENT MOTION TO REOPEN THE 
SUPPRESSION HEARING WAS PLAIN ERROR 
Defendant cites three cases in support of his claim that the trial court's ruling 
was not plain error. See Aple. Br. at 14-15 (citing State v. Johnson, 782 P.2d 533 (Utah 
App. 1989)); see id. at 19 (citing, without analysis, State v. Gardner, 2001 UT 41, 23 
P.3d 1043; Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991)). 
In all three cases, the appellate court considered motions to reconsider a trial 
court's prior ruling as motions for new trial. See Gardner, 2001 UT 41, ^ 3, 7-8 
(construing motion to reconsider ''filed in response to the imposition of sentence" as 
motion for new trial); Watkiss, 808 P.2d at 1063-65 (construing motion to reconsider 
grant of summary judgment as motion for new trial); Johnson, 782 P.2d 534-35 
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(considering motion to reopen preliminary hearing filed after order of dismissal as 
motion for new trial). 
In each case, however, the appellate court considered the motion as having 
been filed after the final judgment in the case. See Gardner, 2001 UT 41, ]ff 3,. 7-8; 
Watkiss, 808 P.2d at 1063-65; Johnson, 782 P.2d at 534-35. As suggested in the State's 
opening brief, application of the new trial motion standard to a post-judgment 
motion may be appropriate because the purpose of the motion is to upset a prior 
final judgment. 
In this case, however, the State's motion to reopen the suppression hearing 
was filed prior to final judgment. Under well-established case law, a trial court has 
wide discretion to reopen issues prior to final judgment, and that discretion is not 
limited by the standards governing motions for new trial. See See Gardner v. 
Christensen, 622 P.2d 782, 784 (Utah 1980); Ross v. Leftwich, 14 Utah 2d 71,377 P.2d 
495, 497 (1963); State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600, 601 (1951); State v. 
Duncan, 102 Utah 449,132 P.2d 121,125 (1942); Wasatch Oil Refining Co. v. Wade, 92 
Utah 50, 63 P.2d 1070,1075 (1936); State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 954,962 (Utah App. 1992). 
The State is not asserting that a trial court must, in every case, grant a party's 
motion to reopen a suppression hearing. Rather, the State is asserting that, because 
of the serious implications of a wrongly decided suppression motion, the trial 
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court's consideration of a motion to reopen must at least include factors other than 
whether the evidence sought to be presented is newly discovered. See, e.g., United 
States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17,22-24 (1st Cir, 1992) (suggesting courts should consider 
nature of case, timeliness of motion, reason evidence was omitted at prior hearing, 
and impact evidence would have on trial court's suppression ruling); United States v. 
Rabb, 752 F.2d 1320,1323 (9th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by Bourjaily v. 
United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987); United States v. Regilio, 669 F.2d 1169,1177 (7th Cir. 
1981); see also Aplt. Br. at 30-31. The Utah case law cited above plainly supports the 
State's position. And the trial court's application of rule 24 to the State's motion is 
plain error in light of that case law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in the State's opening brief and in this Reply, the trial 
court erred in granting Defendant's motion to suppress his confession. 
Alternatively, this Court should remand this matter to the trial court with an order 
to reopen the suppression hearing. 
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Respectfully submitted this g day of November, 2009. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
Mutj*&/Cu<iUch 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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